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[Abstract] This paper focuses on how leaders in Western countries talk about the “war on ter-
rorism.” The paper discusses the difﬁculties of deﬁning “terrorism,” because, unlike Marxism 
or capitalism, “terrorism” is not an ideology.  Instead the term may be used to designate actions 
that are used by members of non-governmental organizations against civilian targets.  In the 
case of the “war on terrorism,” the signiﬁer, “terrorism,” is used widely.  However, the signiﬁed, 
the perpetrators and what they do, are quite different.   Because the designation of the signiﬁed 
depends upon the speaker, the concept of terrorism seems to be subjective and ﬂuid.  The signi-
ﬁed switches radically both by context and over time, while the only aspect that is stable is the 
signiﬁer, “terrorism.”  The paper goes on to analyze the “war on terrorism” as an ontological 
metaphor.  The paper concludes by arguing that although ﬁgures of speech contribute to the 
cognitive dimension of meaning by helping us to recognize the equivalence to which we are 
committed and suggesting new equivalences, metaphors like the “war on terrorism” raise prob-
lems and do little to increase our understanding.  Considering different cultural codes and world 
views, this type of metaphor is highly counterproductive for communication on the global level. 
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Russia, and the United States1
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Introduction 
 
The carefully planned and coordinated terror attack of September 11, 2001 was 
the bloodiest attack on the American mainland in modern times.  Live TV 
coverage where CNN had the standing title of “America under attack” enabled 
the whole world to witness the unprecedented catastrophe.  President George W. 
Bush said among other things: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our 
very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist 
acts… These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American 
resolve.” This is how President Bush put the “war on terrorism” on the 
international agenda.  But how does one make war on terrorism or any other 
“ism”? 
 
Our Research: The “War on Terrorism” 
 
Our research on the “War on Terrorism” focuses on the problem of comparing 
the linguistic formulations of policy officials in a number of Western 
countries.  Comparative research like this is a challenge, because we can not 
rely on any single theoretical approach.  Cognitive psychology is useful because 
we can examine the world views of the officials, but other approaches, like 
semiotics and critical metaphor analysis, are needed to capture the culturally-
specific cognitive structures and cultural codes embedded in the linguistic 
structures.  Our contribution is to combine these approaches to analyze the 
communicative problems involved in talking about terrorism and understand 
better the policy implications that are drawn by officials in different countries.  
 
Interviews with Japanese Officials 
 
We began our research in April 2006 with a series of interviews with eight 
Japanese officials, including officials in the Cabinet Secretariat, Japanese 
Defense Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Defense Academy, 
National Police Agency, and independent think tanks.  We asked these officials 
to define “terrorism,” distinguish between “terror” and “terrorism,” discuss causes 
of terrorism, and talk about the “war on terrorism” and the “global war on terror.”  
In addition to these interviews, we have done a close reading of the speeches of 
(former) Prime Minister Koizumi from September 2001 until April 2006.  We have 
also read the speeches of President Putin from the same time period in both 
Russian and English translation.  Later, we will interview government officials in 
Russia, selected European countries, and the United States.  
 
Research Questions 
 
The research is composed of two parts: one descriptive, where we focus on 
widely different perceptions expressed by policy-makers in Western countries, 
and make use of concepts from semiotics and analytical tools like cognitive 
mapping and critical metaphor analysis to help explain why this is so.  The 
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second part is prescriptive, where we offer policy proposals on how to cope with 
the societal risks linked to terrorism.  Here the assumption is that consensual 
policies will be more optimal in dealing with the problem.  
 
Descriptive Research Questions 
 
1. What are the cultural codes linked to the central concepts used by policy-
makers in different countries, when they talk about the “war on terrorism”?   Here 
we hypothesize that the even though the signifier, “terrorism,” may be the same 
for everyone, the signified is not.  For example, when Japanese officials talk 
about terrorism, they use the word, “tero,” a shortened form that does not 
distinguish between “terror” and “terrorism” as understood in the United States, 
for example. 
 
2. What are the cultural codes linked to figures of speech evoked by 
policy-makers in different countries, when they talk about the “war on terrorism”?   
Metaphors are typically historically determined and will serve to explain 
differences in the way terrorism is viewed.  In the Japanese context, for example, 
“war” is considered to be a conflict between sovereign states, which Japan has 
renounced in Article Nine of their Constitution.1  As a consequence, Japanese 
officials always use the term “fight” rather than “war” against terrorism, except 
when they are talking to officials from the United States. 
 
3. What are the cultural codes linked to different themes evoked by policy-
makers when talking about the war on terrorism?  Here we hypothesize that 
there are variations in the themes that are evoked, when talking about terrorism 
and these differences illustrate the lack of consensus on what constitutes the 
problem.  President Putin, for example, often explains terrorism as a 
consequence of “internal conflicts and inter-ethnic divisions that were once firmly 
suppressed by the ruling ideology,” but “have “now flared up.”2 
 
We would expect to find predictable differences between the cognitive 
frameworks of officials in various Western countries: the United States, which 
has a global perspective as the only remaining superpower; Russia, a former 
superpower, which is attempting to cope with the problem of Chechnya; Japan, 
which has experienced attacks from domestic terrorists; Great Britain, which 
faces terrorist threats from domestic Muslim groups; France, Germany, and Italy, 
which have a European perspective; and Canada, which shares a border with the 
United States.  For example, we would expect United States (and Russia) to talk 
                                                 
1   ARTICLE 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of 
settling international disputes. 第九条 日本国民は、正義と秩序を基調とする国際平和を誠実に希求し
、国権の発動たる戦争と、武力による威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛争を解決する手段としては、永久
にこれを放棄する。 
 
2  Address by President Vladimir Putin, The Kremlin, 4 September 2004 (author’s translation). 
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mostly about “how to hunt down terrorists,” while the Europeans and Japanese 
will be more focussed on the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty. 
 
Prescriptive Research Questions  
 
The prescriptive part of our research rests on the assumption that even though 
there are a whole set of variables that help to explain differences in both the 
perception of terrorism and appropriate action, cultural codes constitute an 
important residual in explaining both differing perceptions as well as actions 
taken against terrorism.  This residual variable deserves particular attention in 
policy relevant research, since perceptions are fluid and subject to change.  
Different cultural codes linked to the concept of terrorism may have a potential 
impact on the ability of these countries to work together constructively and reach 
a common understanding. 
 
1. To what extent are perceptions of the war on terrorism being used by policy-
makers in different countries to promote their own world view and justify their 
actions? 
 
2. To what extent can rhetorical devices used by policy-makers such as concepts, 
figures of speech, and themes be said to create biased perceptions of the 
terrorist threat? 
 
3. How can our knowledge of biases in perceptual processes derived from our 
research improve the analytical quality of research on terrorism? 
 
4. How can we reach a more consensual understanding of what constitutes the 
problem and thereby cope with it in a more optimal way both within societies and 
between different countries?  
 
The research will be particularly pertinent to the concerns expressed in the 
United States, but even more so in Europe, on the widely differing perceptions of 
terrorism and what actions should and ought to be taken to reduce societal risks 
embedded in the problem. 
 
Approaches and Methods 
 
We propose to analyze and compare the linguistic formulations of policy officials 
in Western countries as they talk about the war on terrorism, describe the causes 
of global terrorism, and discuss consequences of terrorism for international 
affairs.  We are especially interested in their use of culturally-specific cognitive 
structures, including figurative language, to discuss the possibility of terrorist 
attacks, and we will conduct a comparative analysis of these structures to help 
explain differences in policy prescriptions. 
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To support this analysis of the linguistic formulations of policy officials, we will 
use both the technique of cognitive mapping and critical metaphor analysis.  
Interviews will be conducted (and recordings) made with primarily policy officials 
about how they would characterize such terrorism.  The analysis will compare the 
conceptualizations of the various Western officials, including the cognitive 
structures and the figurative language used.  
 
In each country, we will identify national security, foreign affairs, intelligence, and 
internal security officials who deal with terrorism and related issues.  We will 
interview these officials using a standardized instrument.  The interviews will be 
recorded and transcribe for further analysis.  
 
We have developed the technique of cognitive mapping to study a wide-range of 
policy issues, including conflicts in the Middle East, the Limited Test Ban 
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and oil policy in 
Norway.3  In a cognitive map constructed the text of an interview with a policy 
official, the concepts of the official are described by nodes and the perceived 
causal links are shown by signed arrows.  An arrow with a plus sign indicates a 
positive causal relationship (“leads to,” “contributes to,” “a condition of,” etc.), 
while an arrow with a minus sign denotes a perceived negative causal or quasi-
causal relation (“aggravates,” “diminishes,” etc.), and a zero sign indicates the 
denial of any causal linkage (“does not depend on”).  All of the causal links of the 
official can be aggregated and combined into maps for describing the perceived 
causal relationships of a political collective.4 
 
The analysis of cognitive maps is accomplished by treating them as directed 
graphs or “diagraphs,” and uses the rules of diagraph theory for making 
calculations.  Diagraph theory, a formal system with elaborate rules for moving 
about in a network of interrelated elements, provides an inference structure that 
is convenient for seeing how concepts are relate to each other and the overall 
structure of the set of causal relations.5  Calculation is greatly facilitated because 
the developers of diagraph theory have worked out the relationships between 
and among the elements.  The set of rules (axioms, primitives, theorems, etc.) 
that constitute the theory of directed graphs is far too elaborate to treat here.6 
 
In addition to the coding technique described above, we will also subject the 
interview texts to “processual coding,” a cognitive mapping technique that has 
been developed to capture and compare cultural codes that are embedded in 
                                                 
3   See G. Matthew Bonham, Michael J. Shapiro, and Thomas Trumble, "The October War: Changes in 
Cognitive Orientation toward the Middle East Conflict." International Studies Quarterly, 1979, 3-44; 
G.Matthew Bonham, Victor Sergeev, and Pavel Parshin, "The Limited Test-Ban Agreement: Emergence 
of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation." International Studies Quarterly, 1997, 215-
240; G. Matthew Bonham, Michael J. Shapiro, and Daniel Heradstveit, "Group Cognition: Using an Oil 
Policy  Game to Validate a Computer Simulation." Simulation and Games, 1988, 379-407. 
4  Michael J. Shapiro, G. Matthew Bonham, and Daniel Heradstveit, “A Discursive Practices Approach to 
Collective Decision-Making.”  International Studies Quarterly, 1988, 147-174. 
5   Robert Axelrod, Structure of Decision.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 5. 
6 See Frank Harary, Robert Norman, and Dorwin Cartwright, Structural Models: An Introduction to the 
Theory of Directed Graphs.  New York: John Wiley, 1965. 
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linguistic formulations.  This technique has been used to portray cultural codes 
embedded in Soviet statements from the Cuban (Caribbean) Missile Crisis, the 
foreign policy pronouncements of Gromyko and Shevardnadze, and to compare 
Kennedy and Khrushchev with respect to cultural differences in understanding  
political reality.”7 
 
Many linguistic expressions used by officials are metaphorical, and various 
metaphors of causation are quite common in political texts.  For example, in the 
Limited Test Ban negotiations President Kennedy said “the cold war brings 
burdens and dangers to so many countries….nuclear powers must avert those 
confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat 
or a nuclear war.”  In these passages words with originally spatial semantics are 
used to suggest causal meaning through metaphorical transfer from spatial 
image schemas to causal target domains.8 
 
To help identify and analyze the connotative language used by the officials whom 
we interview, we will use the technique of critical metaphor analysis.  Critical 
metaphor analysis is an approach “that aims to identify the intentions and 
ideologies underlying language use.”9  The approach is based on the work of 
Lakoff and Johnson, which has been further modified by others.10  “The basic 
claims of this approach are that the mind is inherently embodied, thought is 
mostly unconscious and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.”11  The 
technique provides an economical way of identifying metaphorical and 
metonymic thinking, as well as describing and conceptual metaphors.  Additional 
analysis is necessary, however, to provide the social and cultural context of the 
metaphor.12 
 
After completing the interviews with Western officials, we will subject the 
interview transcripts to critical metaphor analysis.  This involves three stages: 
Identification of the metaphor (or metonym) used by the official; interpretation of 
the metaphor; and explanation of the metaphor.   For example, in a newspaper 
interview, President Putin said, “We do not engage in dialogue with those who 
                                                 
 7   See Pavel Parshin and Victor Sergeev, “Conceptual Reconstruction and Conflict Resolution: Further 
Reflections on the Caribbean Crisis.  Paper presented at the 31st Annual Convention of the International  
Studies Association, Washington, DC, 1990; Victor Sergeev and Pavel Parshin, “ Processes, 
Metamorphoses, and Procedures; ‘The New Thinking as Reflected in Linguistic Structures.  Paper 
presented at the third NAS-AS USSR Workshop on Models and Concepts of Interdependence between 
Nations, Berkeley, California, 1990; G. Matthew Bonham, Victor Sergeev, and Pavel Parshin, "The 
Limited Test-Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation." 
International Studies Quarterly, 1997, 215-240. 
 8 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1980. 
 9 Jonathan Charteris-Black, p. 26. 
10 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999; George Lakoff, Women, Fire and 
Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987; George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Metaphor” in A. Ortony (ed.) Metaphor and Thought, 2nd  
edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 202-51; and George Lakoff, Moral Politics, 2nd 
edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002; George Lakoff and Turner,  More than Cool 
Reason:  A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989; Mark Johnson, 
The Body  in the Mind.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
11 Jonathan Charteris-Black, p. 26. 
12  Jonathan Charteris-Black, p. 29. 
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have the blood of Russian citizens on their hands…” (7 February 2007).  Here 
the conceptual metaphor is CONFLICT IS BLOOD.  The interpretation of Putin’s 
use of this metaphor would involve a discussion of his characterization of 
“terrorists” in the Republic of Chechnya as criminals and murders.  The analysis 
would focus on Putin choice of this metaphor and Russian cultural codes. 
 
 
 Defining Terrorism 
 
A major problem for the United States and other Western countries is their 
inability to agree on what they are fighting against.  As Robert Kagan has pointed 
out, “It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a 
common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.”13  If there 
is no agreement on the term, “terrorism,” oppressive regimes will add their own 
separatists, insurgents, and dissidents to the list of “international terrorists” One 
of the problems is that the “ism” suffix is usually associated with an ideology, 
such as Marxism or communism.  But “terrorism” is not an ideology; instead, it is 
a method that is used against civilian targets.  The term is used to designate 
people who are doing things to others, the victims, for a wide variety of reasons. 
Here both the perpetrators and the victims are important in the definition.  The 
perpetrators are members of non-governmental organizations and the victims are 
civilians. 
 
To help clarify this problem we can turn to the continental semiotic theory of 
Ferdinand de Saussure.  For Saussure, a sign consists of a signifier and a 
signified. The relationship between the signifier and the signified is referred to 
as signification, which is represented in the Saussurean diagram by arrows. 
The horizontal line marking the two elements of the sign is referred to as the bar.  
For example, the word “terrorist” is a sign consisting of the following:  A signifier, 
the word “terrorist,” and a signified concept—a person who attacks innocent 
civilian targets.  A sign must have both a signifier and a signified. You cannot 
have a totally meaningless signifier or a completely formless signified. The same 
signifier could stand for a different signified (and thus be a different sign). 
 
In the case of terrorism, the signifier, “terrorism” is used widely by many including 
the governments of the USA, Russia, and Sri Lanka.  But the signified, the 
perpetrators and what they do are quite different: Al-Qaida, the Chechens, and 
the Tamil Tigers.  Because the designation of signified depends upon the 
speaker, the concept of terrorism is seems to be subjective and fluid. The 
signified switches radically both by context and over time. The only aspect that 
is stable is the signifier, “terrorism.” 
 
The rhetoric of terrorism is being waged with weapons that are loose, diffuse, 
and highly flexible. The signifier is clear-cut, but the signified is not.  Thus, the 
“war on terrorism” is largely a rhetorical instrument—a form of political 
                                                 
13 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, June 2002. 
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communication that packs an emotional punch.  In the case of former Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi, for example, neither the signifier nor the signified are 
clear cut: “Fight against terrorism” (テロリズムとの戦い); “War on terrorism”（対
テロ戦争）and “Terror” or “Terrorism” (テロリズムとの闘い ). 
 
The War on Terrorism as Political Communication 
 
Denotative language uses many words in a neutral, precise manner to describe a 
phenomenon. For this reason it functions very poorly as a rhetorical instrument, 
for rhetoric works best with connotative language, i.e., using few words in a 
loose, diffuse and flexible manner. Rhetorical language is also affective, and 
there are few words that pack such an emotional punch as “terrorism.”  
 
The use of metaphors, such as the “war on terrorism,” can be a highly effective 
technique of political communication.  Such figures of speech are often used by 
political leaders to persuade others, including the leaders of other countries as 
well as their own people.  Metaphors are powerful, because they exploit “the 
associative power of language and represent “a certain way of viewing the world 
that reflects a shared system of belief as to what the world is and culture-specific 
beliefs about mankind’s place in it….Metaphor provokes affective responses 
because it draws on value systems…embedded in a culture where certain types 
of entity are associated with positive or negative experiences or may be 
universal.”14 
 
In the United States, for example, an ancestor of the “war on terrorism” is the 
“war on drugs,” which similarly legitimized extraordinary measures with 
consequences for due process and civil liberties. Common to both “wars” 
appears to be the financing of American police departments by forfeiture of 
assets considered to be drug- or terrorism-related, which offers certain players a 
powerful stake in the continuance and development of the system.  
 
Metaphor and Metonymy 
 
How does metaphor create new insight, a new understanding?  Ricoeur, quoting 
Black,15 uses an example to describe the mechanism:  Let our metaphor be “Man 
is a wolf.”  The focus, “wolf,” operates not on the basis of lexical meaning, but by 
virtue…of the opinions and preconceptions to which a reader in a linguistic 
community, by the fact that he speaks, finds himself committed….To call a man a 
wolf is to evoke the lupine system of associated commonplaces.  One speaks 
then of the man in “wolf-language.”  Acting as a filter or a screen, “The wolf-
metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others—in short, organizes our 
view of man.”  In this way metaphor confers an “insight.”16   
                                                 
14 onathan Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric.  The Persuasive Power of Metaphor. Houndsmill and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 20. 
15  Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962). 
16  Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 87. 
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In the study of discourse rhetoricians distinguish between metaphor and 
metonymy.  Schofer and Rice characterize metaphor as a “semantic and 
referential relationship of resemblance made possible by the possession of one 
or more common features.”  The metaphorical processes involve a transfer of 
meaning.  Metonymy, on the other hand, can be characterized by a “semantic 
and referential relationship of causality made possible by the category of 
semantic feature cause.  Their definition of metonymy suggests a major limitation 
of this trope.17   
 
Sapir proposes that metaphor “states an equivalence between terms taken from 
separate semantic domains,” such as “George the Lion,” when applied to a 
football player.  Metonymy, according to Sapir, “replaces or juxtaposes 
contiguous terms that occupy a distinct and separate place with what is 
considered a single semantic or perceptual domain.”  For example, Homer will 
often be used instead of the Iliad: “you will read in Homer.”18  Sapir treats 
metonymy as the logical inverse of a metaphor.  Rather than emphasizing the 
relationship between two terms taken from different domains, metonymy 
“emphasizes the whole, the entire domain shared by two terms, and its success 
as a trope depends upon how fully this idea of wholeness can be conveyed.”19 
Lakoff has elaborated the idea of “metonymic prototypes.”  “If B is a category and 
A is a member, or subcategory, of B, the result is a metonymic category structure, 
in which A is a metonymic prototype.”  He further describes a “classical category” 
of a metonymic prototype as follows: 
 
Consider a cognitive model containing a feature bundle that characterizes a 
classical category B.  If A has all the properties in the feature bundle, it is a best 
example of B.  An element C, having some of the properties in the feature bundle, 
may be judged as a less good example of B.  Strictly speaking, C will be outside 
B; but people, in such cases, may consider B a graded category, such that 
elements bearing a degree of similarity to members of B will be viewed as being 
members of B to a degree.20   
 
In the case of the “Axis of Evil,” metaphor, for example, it can be said that Iraq 
and North Korea are viewed by the Bush Administration as A, that is, best 
examples of the feature bundle B, a coalition of evil countries and their terrorist 
allies that are engaged in terrorist activities against the West.  Iran is element C, 
a less good example of feature bundle B, because some of Iran’s leadership is 
democratically elected. 
 
                                                 
17  Peter Schofer and Donald Rice, “Metaphor, Metonymy, and Synecdoche Revis(it)ed,” Semiotica Vol. 21, 
No. 1/2 (1977), pp. 122-123.  
18  J. David Sapir, “The Anatomy of Metaphor,” in the Social Use of Metaphor,  ed. J. D. Sapir and J. C. 
Crocker   (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), p. 4. 
19  Sapir, p. 20. 
20  Lakoff, 1986, pp. 288-289. 
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The War on Terrorism as Ontological Metaphor 
 
Lakoff and Johnson argue that our experience with physical objects provide the 
basis for ontological metaphors, that is metaphors about “being.” For example, 
we often view inflation as an entity: “We need to combat inflation”; “Inflation is 
taking its toll at the gasoline pump”; “If there is much more inflation, we will not 
survive”; “Inflation makes me sick.”  Viewing inflation as an entity enables us to 
refer to it, quantify it, identify a particular aspect, see it as a cause, and act with 
respect to it.  Nevertheless, viewing a non-physical thing as an entity does not 
allow us to comprehend much about it.  To do this, the metaphor has to be 
elaborated to specify different kinds of objects.21  
 
Ontological metaphors like these are so natural that they are usually taken as 
self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena.  We believe the statement, 
“He cracked under pressure” to be either true or false.  The fact that it is 
metaphorical never occurs to us…and we do not bother to analyze its 
appropriateness as a metaphor.  For example, Former Prime Minister Koizumi 
described terrorism as follows:  “International terrorism is a despicable act that 
threatens the lives and lifestyles of people all over the world and the peace 
and security of all countries of the world (8 October 2001).”  Here, terrorism, a 
non-physical thing, is treated as an entity or thing that has an objective reality. 
 
Like inflation, this view of terrorism enables us to suggest how to act.  As Koizumi 
pointed out, we must “…prevent and eradicate international terrorism.”  (8 
October 2001).  Note also here that another metaphor is evoked: “terrorism is 
contagion” that must be eradicated.  As in the case of disease, we must “actively 
contribute to international efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism (8 October 
2001).”  Although the treatment of terrorism as an entity helps us to talk about 
terrorism, it does little to increase our understanding of the phenomenon or 
communicate effectively across cultures.  
 
In short, the “war on terrorism” metaphor communicates a simple message to the 
public. The message divides the world with respect to friends and enemies. 
The message also suggests what is to be done, namely, wage a struggle against 
an entity--terrorism.  However, like the “cold war,” the metaphor suggests little 
meaning and explains nothing about the phenomenon and its implications. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We hope this research will be instrumental in promoting greater understanding of 
terrorism by increasing the cognitive complexity of policy-makers on this issue. 
The basic assumption is that up to now the Western response to terrorism and, 
especially that of the United States, has not promoted understanding of the 
problem and how to respond to it.  Strategies have been built on intuitive 
reactions rather than true insight.  By comparing and contrasting different 
                                                 
21 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 
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perceptions and exposing them to policy-makers in the United States and other 
Western countries, more complex thinking about terrorism may evolve.  We also 
hope that the research will help policy makers to discuss terrorism using a 
common language.  Although they appear to be talking about the same thing, it is 
clear that they often have different understandings of terrorism.  As President 
Putin has pointed out, “Unless we learn to speak the same conceptual language, 
we shall never achieve our common goals and will never protect our people—
ours, yours, all the people on the planet against this threat, this plague of the 21st 
century, from terrorism.”22 
 
                                                 
22 Vladimir Putin, “Final Words at the World Congress of News Agencies,” 24 September 2004 (author’s 
translation). 
